6. Determinants of Crop Choices under Uncertainty by Takashi Kurosaki
6. Determinants of Crop Choices under
Uncertainty
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
シリーズタイトル(英
)
Occasional Papers Series
シリーズ番号 34
journal or
publication title
Risk and Household Behavior in Pakistan's
Agr culture
page range 90-109
year 1998
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00010696
90 CHAPTER  6
6
Determinants of Crop Choices
under Uncertainty
In this chapter, the determinants of crop choices by sample households in the
Pakistan Punjab are analyzed.1 The analysis is based on a structural house-
hold model of production that incorporates the effects of incomplete insur-
ance markets and the consideration for domestic food consumption.
A theoretical model is proposed in which households’ crop choices are af-
fected not only by their willingness to bear risk but also by their ordinal con-
sumption preferences for individual goods, when both income and consump-
tion prices are stochastic. Households’ willingness to bear risk reflects their
risk attitudes and the extent to which consumption smoothing arrangements
are available. The household model is an attempt to link the intertemporal
consumption model of risk-coping mechanism with the risk-management pro-
duction model in which the distribution of household income is endogenously
determined (Chapter 2), such as Morduch (1995, 1990), Rosenzweig and
Wolpin (1993), and Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993).
In this chapter emphasis is placed on testing econometrically whether or
not a model with these characteristics is able to explain the behavior of sample
households. In the first section, an intertemporal household model of crop
choices under uncertainty is proposed. In the second section, econometric
specifications are developed to test the hypotheses. Estimation and specifica-
tion test results are presented in the third section. A non-nested likelihood test
is applied to show that the model with ordinal consumption preference effects
under incomplete insurance markets is superior to a model without these ef-
fects or a model of expected-profit maximization.
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I. A Household Model
1. Income Risk, Insurance, and Crop Choices
The intertemporal household model in this study was inspired from Morduch
(1990). Given the amount of “cash on hand” xt, households maximize their
lifetime utility by choosing the amount of assets held over into the next period
St, the coverage of income insurance qt, and the production portfolio lt. The
maximization problem is equivalent to finding the value function V(xt), defined
by the functional equation
V x u c E V xt
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t t t
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where u(ct) is an instantaneous utility function that satisfies u′(ct) > 0,
u″(ct) < 0, and u′′′(ct)≥0, δ is the rate of time preference, and r is the risk-free
interest rate on St. The amount of net saving St is constrained in the interval of
a floor of −SL (negative of the borrowing limit) and a ceiling of xt. The pur-
chase of insurance qt incurs the premium payment of I(qt) and results in the
insurance payment of Q(qt, εt+1) in the next period, contingent on a realization
of the exogenous shock εt+1. The choice of production portfolio lt determines
the distribution of production income Z(..) in the next period, which is also
contingent on a realization of εt+1. It is assumed that the value function exists
and that it is unique and differentiable.
The first-order condition for the optimal choice of St is an Euler equation
with a Lagrangean multiplier for the borrowing constraint (Morduch 1990;
Deaton 1991). The first-order condition for the optimal production decision,
on which emphasis is placed in this paper, is given as
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lt t t
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(6.2)
Equation (6.2) shows that the optimal portfolio choice is affected by the
slope of the value function. At one extreme, when borrowing and saving are
not allowed and income insurance is not available at all, V′(xt+1) in (6.2) is
replaced by u′(ct+1), the slope of the instantaneous utility function. In this case,
the optimal crop choice should reflect households’ risk attitude, which is rep-
resented by the curvature of u(c). This situation corresponds to the absence of
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ex post insurance arrangements. At the other extreme, when full insurance is
available without constraint on qt, households’ crop choices do not depend on
their risk preferences. They choose the crop portfolio that maximizes expected
profit. This situation reflects the existence of complete insurance markets. In a
more general situation between the two extreme cases, the curvature of the
value function becomes less concave as ex post insurance arrangements be-
come more available.2 To summarize, the optimal crop choice depends on
three factors: the extent to which ex post consumption smoothing mecha-
nisms are available, the level of cash on hand, and the curvature of the instan-
taneous utility function.
2. Consumption Price Risk, Ordinal Preferences, and Crop Choices
The price level of consumption goods prevailing in the harvest period is
usually unknown at the time of agricultural production decisions. To incorpo-
rate this type of price uncertainty, ct is redefined in the instantaneous utility
function as a vector of consumption goods. Since its price vector pt is known
when ct is consumed, the instantaneous direct utility function u(ct) in (6.1) can
be replaced by an instantaneous indirect utility function v(yt, pt) where con-
sumption expenditure yt is the inner product of pt and ct.
This replacement does not alter equation (6.2) but adds another dimension
that affects the optimal production choice. The curvature of the value function
now depends on a realization of pt as well as yt, because the partial derivative
of the instantaneous utility function, ∂v/∂y, is a function of yt and pt. When yt
and pt are positively correlated, the curvature of the value function becomes
less concave since the positive correlation stabilizes the value of ∂v/∂y. The
effect of the variability of pt on ∂v/∂y depends on ordinal preferences for indi-
vidual goods, such as demand elasticities and budget shares (Newbery and
Stiglitz 1981, p. 117).
When households’ consumption expenditure on a food crop is large and its
income elasticity is low, they are better off if their income and the food price
are positively covariate. Growing the food crop on their farms is an obvious
way to make their income and the food price covariate (Fafchamps 1992a;
Finkelshtain and Chalfant 1991). According to Fafchamps (1992a), the ad-
vantage in terms of risk management of growing a crop whose profit is posi-
tively correlated with prices of major consumption items is referred to as “con-
sumption price effects”; the advantage of growing a crop whose profit is
negatively correlated with household income is referred to as “portfolio ef-
fects.”3
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II. An Empirical Model
1. Empirical Setting
Figure 6-1 shows the decision timing of the empirical model. Production
choice variables in the empirical model are the acreage shares of the four
major crops in the study area (basmati paddy, wheat, and kharif and rabi fod-
der crops). They are denoted by lsi, where subscripts s (= k, r) represent two
cropping seasons of kharif and rabi, and subscripts i (= 1, 2) represent food-
grain and fodder crops. Crops in different seasons do not compete for land
directly. In addition to these crop activities, households keep livestock that
produce milk. Milk production in the two seasons is treated as two distinct
farm activities. Before the two cropping seasons begin, households decide on
a production plan, which is implemented at the beginning of each cropping
season. At the end of each season, after price and yield risks are resolved,
households harvest crops and feed green fodder to livestock animals. After
the two cropping seasons, households enjoy consumption, based on the real-
ization of farm income and consumption prices. Considering the tight sched-
ule of the consecutive farm operations of kharif harvest and rabi sowing, it is
assumed that households do not adjust rabi crop choices at the beginning of
rabi.
The six farm activities (basmati, wheat, kharif and rabi fodder, and kharif
and rabi milk), together with nonfarm income YN that is assumed to be non-
stochastic, constitute households’ income flow Z(lt, εt+1) as
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si t s t sm t s t N t
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where π(ε) is per-unit profit from farm activities net of production cost, Ls is
the acreage of land available in s, and As is the size of a livestock herd in s.
π(ε) is stochastic due to price and yield risk represented by ε. Households are
assumed to have rational expectations with respect to the distribution of ε.
The empirical model has additional constraints on production. Due to tech-
nological constraints, such as resource constraints or lumpiness of some in-
puts (Eswaran and Kotwal 1986; Chavas and Holt 1996), households cannot
grow just one crop on all their land. They also have to leave a fixed portion of
their land fallow. The following equations incorporate these constraints:
g l ls s t s t s1 2 0, ,, ; ,α( ) = s = k, r, (6.4)
where α is a vector of parameters characterizing the technical substitutability
of two crops in each season.
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With the specification in (6.3) and the additional constraints in (6.4), the
first-order condition for the optimal production decision in (6.2) becomes
E V g
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g l ls s t s t s1 2 0, ,, ; ,α( ) = s = k, r,
where the quotient of partial derivatives of gs shows a marginal rate of trans-
formation in season s (denoted MRTs below). This system of four equations
implicitly defines the optimal crop choices.
2. Specification of the Empirical Model
To convert the system of equations in (6.5) into an estimable system, two
approximations were adopted. First, based on the discussion in the first sec-
tion that the curvature of the value function depends on risk attitudes, insur-
ance availability, and ordinal consumption preferences, the value function V(x)
was approximated by an instantaneous indirect utility function v(y, p) with
structural parameters β, γ, and ψ. Vectors β and γ represent ordinal prefer-
ences for individual goods. Households’ willingness to bear risk is character-
ized by ψ. If households can use some ex post consumption-smoothing mea-
sures, ψ reveals the mixture of households’ risk attitudes and the availability
of these measures (Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993). Second, following
Consumption decisions / Determination of household assets (Lk, Lr, Ak, Ar, etc.)
Production decisions on lk1, lk2, lr1, and lr2 (based on ex ante income and prices)
Kharif season
Crop planting (implementation of lk1 and lk2)
? εk is resolved
Crop harvesting and milk production (farm income in kharif determined)
Rabi season
Crop planting (implementation of lr1 and lr2)
? εr is resolved
Crop harvesting and milk production (farm income in rabi determined)
Consumption decisions / Determination of household assets
(based on the realized income and prices)
Production decisions on lk1, lk2, lr1, and lr2
t
t+1
Time horizon
Fig. 6-1. Decision Timing of the Household Model
Source: Prepared by the author.
(6.5)
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Fafchamps (1992a), the slope of the value function in (6.5) was replaced by
the first-order Taylor approximation to convert the expectation operator into
manageable forms of means and variances. With these approximations and
dropping time subscripts for simplicity, the first two equations in (6.5) be-
came
0 1 2 1 2= ′ ⋅ − ⋅( )[ ] ≈ ( ) ⋅ − ⋅( )[ ]E V MRT E v y p MRTs s s y s s sπ π β γ ψ π π, ; , ,
≈ − ⋅( ) + ⋅ −( ) − ⋅( )[ ] =∑v MRT
v
v
E p p MRTy s s s y p
y
j j s s s
j
n
jπ π π π1 2 1 2
1
,
+ ⋅ −( ) − ⋅( )[ ]
v
v
E Z Z MRTy y
y
s s s
,
,π π1 2 s = k, r, (6.6)
where vy(..) denotes derivative of v(..) with respect to y.
In the estimation, a consumption demand system was added to the produc-
tion equations to estimate β and γ reliably. The linear expenditure system
(LES) with the following specification was adopted, since it has an explicit
indirect utility function and allows income elasticity of demand to differ by
commodity. To focus on the interaction between consumption prices and farm
profits, consumption goods were divided into four categories: wheat (w), milk
and milk products (m), rice (r), and other consumption goods (o). Thus, the
demand system was specified as
p x p Y pEP k k EP k k k EP EP j j
j w m r o
, , ,
, , ,
,= + −



= ∑γ β γ k = w, m, r, o, (6.7)
with
β j
j w m r o
=
=
∑ 1,
, , ,
where pEP,k is the ex post price of consumption item k, xk is its consumption
quantity, YEP is the ex post consumption expenditure, γ is a vector of subsis-
tence requirements, and β represents the marginal propensity to spend on each
good after meeting the subsistence requirements.4
The indirect utility function associated with this demand system, which
can incorporate risk aversion, is expressed as
v y p
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(6.8)
where ψ is interpreted as the coefficient of relative risk aversion given the
insurance availability, with respect to the argument inside the bracket. Using
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(6.8), vy, vy,pj, and vy,y are calculated accordingly and their expected values are
inserted into (6.6) such as
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After rearrangement, the empirical equations for the optimal crop choices
become
f f MRT f f MRT ls s s s ti s ti s ti
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s = k, r, (6.9)
where coefficient fsz is a nonlinear function of parameters β, γ, and ψ, and
variables characterizing market and production environments, such as the ra-
tios of expected returns, the coefficients of variation of prices and per-acre
profits, correlation coefficients between prices and profits, the sizes of live-
stock, land, and nonfarm income (see Appendix to this chapter for exact defi-
nitions).
In the estimation, it is assumed that parameters ψ and β vary with house-
hold characteristics in the following way:
ψ ψ ψ ψψ ψh h k hk
k
Z Z= ( ) = + ⋅∑, , ,0
β β β ββ βih i h i ik hk
k
Z Z= ( ) = + ⋅∑, , ,0
where Zψ,h is a vector of variables that affect households’ ability to bear risk,
such as physical and human capital assets, and Zβ,h is a vector of variables that
shift the taste for each consumption good, such as demographic composition.
Zψ,h includes the number of livestock animals and the size of landownership as
a proxy to physical assets and the educational status of a household head as a
proxy to a human capital asset. The dependency ratio, defined as the number
of children under ten years old divided by the total number of household mem-
bers, is used as a variable characterizing the demographic composition of a
household.
The technological constraints on crop choices are specified by the follow-
ing quadratic functions:
g l l l D l ls s s s s s sw tw s s s s1 2 2 0 1 1 2 12 0, ; ,α α α α α( ) = + + ⋅ + + = s = k, r,
(6.11)
where Dtw is a dummy variable for the ownership of a tubewell. The availabil-
ity of tubewells is the most important technical factor in the Punjab agricul-
ture. If the coefficient on the dummy variable is negative, land-use intensity
in farms with a tubewell is higher than in farms without it.
(6.10)
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3. Estimation Procedure
The system of seven equations [two first-order conditions for the optimal
crop choices given in (6.9), two equations for the crop choice constraints in
(6.11), and three equations for the consumption demand system in (6.7)] was
estimated by a full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) method. Since
the subsystem of four production equations in (6.9) and (6.11) cannot be solved
explicitly, it had to be estimated in an implicit form.
To use the sample in econometric estimation, a normal error vector was
added to the system. An exact form of the FIML log-likelihood function is
given in the appendix to this chapter. The maximum likelihood estimator is
defined as a root of the equations of the derivatives of the log-likelihood func-
tion with respect to each parameter. It is consistent and asymptotically effi-
cient under fairly general conditions (Judge et al. 1985, pp. 178–80).
Table 6-1 summarizes the definitions and statistics of the empirical vari-
ables used in the estimation. The system to be estimated consists of seven
endogenous variables: the acreage share of each crop lsi (s=k, r; i =1, 2), defined
as the area devoted to crop si divided by the area available for crop choices in
season s including fallow land; and pEP,k · xPC,k (k= w, m, r), per capita expendi-
ture for item k. These seven variables are constructed based on the household
data of all sample observations.
Exogenous variables in the empirical model include market and production
environment variables and household-characteristic variables. Among the
market and production environment variables, the coefficients of variation
(CVs) of prices and net profits at the individual farm level have been esti-
mated already in Chapters 4 and 5, based on a model that incorporates idio-
syncratic yield risks, structural differences in production technology among
households, and input cost adjustments.
III. Estimation Results
1. Parameter Estimates
Table 6-2 reports the estimation results. Asymptotic standard errors are
computed by inverting the sums-of-squares matrix of the outer products of
the gradient of the likelihood function with respect to relevant parameters,
according to Berndt et al. (1974). Estimated standard errors are relatively small
compared with coefficient estimates—they are smaller than one-half of the
coefficient estimates in twenty-one of the twenty-two estimated parameters.
All four parameters characterizing ψ, households’ willingness to bear risk,
are statistically significant (Table 6-2). Among the effects of three shifters, the
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TABLE  6-1
DEFINITIONS AND STATISTICS OF THE EMPIRICAL VARIABLES
Standard
Deviation
1. Optimal crop choice equations
Endogenous variables
lk1 Basmati cropped land / Lk unitless 0.653 0.162
lk2 Kharif fodder cropped land / Lk unitless 0.289 0.140
lr1 Wheat cropped land / Lr unitless 0.734 0.106
lr2 Rabi fodder cropped land / Lr unitless 0.209 0.097
Exogenous variables
Lk Kharif land available for two crops
and fallow acre 9.071 7.266
Lr Rabi land available for two crops
and fallow acre 8.846 6.773
Ak No. of kharif milk animals adult units 4.742 2.987
Ar No. of rabi milk animals adult units 4.742 2.987
YN Nonfarm income per household Rs. 6,688 3,609
W Deflated expected non-crop
incomea unitless 14.64 7.084
Wk1 Normalized covariance of crop profit
and milk incomea unitless 0.303 0.196
Wk2 (same)a unitless −1.519 0.988
Wr1 (same)a unitless 1.242 0.791
Wr2 (same)a unitless −5.909 3.839
mk Ratio of expected crop
profits in kharif (cereal over fodder)a unitless 1.066 0.142
mr The same in rabia unitless 1.279 0.075
Qk1w Normalized covariance of crop profit
and consumption pricea unitless 0.008 0.001
Qk2w (same)a unitless 0.008 0.000
Qk1m (same)a unitless −0.001 0.000
Qk2m (same)a unitless 0.037 0.002
Qk1r (same)a unitless 0.036 0.005
Qk2r (same)a unitless −0.024 0.001
Qr1w (same)a unitless 0.024 0.002
Qr2w (same)a unitless 0.007 0.001
Qr1m (same)a unitless 0.016 0.001
Qr2m (same)a unitless 0.031 0.002
Qr1r (same)a unitless 0.022 0.001
Qr2r (same)a unitless 0.045 0.003
Exogenous variables (Preference shifters)
EDU Years of education completed by
the household head years 1.794 3.495
LAND Size of owned agricultural land acre 11.17 9.175
ANIMAL No. of owned livestock animals adult units 6.361 3.534
Variables Definition Unit Mean
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coefficient on animal holding (ψA) is significantly negative and those on edu-
cation (ψE) and landholding (ψL) are significantly positive. The accumulation
of livestock makes households more willing to bear risk. This finding sup-
ports the argument that the liquid nature of animal holding should improve
households’ ability to smooth consumption (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993).
Contrary to expectations, the estimates for land and education are not nega-
tive. There are several possible explanations for these results. First, since the
land sale market is inactive in the study villages, the land asset may be some-
what illiquid. For this argument to be convincing, it must be shown that land
cannot be used as collateral for consumption credit, an issue which is left for
further study. Second, poorer households may be “forced to gamble”
(Shahabuddin, Mestelman, and Feeny 1986, p. 122) to increase the chance of
TABLE  6-1 (Continued)
Standard
Deviation
2. Technological constraints on crop choices
Endogenous variables
lk1, lk2, lr1, lr2
Exogenous variable
Dtw Tubewell ownership dummy, 1 for
owner, 0 for non-owner 0 or 1 0.694 0.462
3. LES
Endogenous variables
pEP, wxPC, w Per capita expenditure on wheat Rs. 406.3 80.8
pEP, mxPC, m Per capita expenditure on milk
and its products Rs. 826.0 167.3
pEP, rxPC, r Per capita expenditure on rice Rs. 125.4 32.8
Exogenous variables
pEP, w Price of wheat at the farm gate Rs. / 40 kg 93.9 10.8
pEP, m Price of milk at the farm gate Rs. / 40 kg 135.0 17.8
pEP, r Price of Basmati paddy at the f.g. Rs. / 40 kg 133.5 3.4
pEP, o Price index of other commodities Year 1 = 200 218.0 17.1
YEP, PC Total per capita consumption
expenditure Rs. 3,055 606.5
Exogenous variables (Preference shifters)
DEP Dependency ratio as the number of
children under 10 divided by
the total number in household unitless 0.268 0.184
Note: The number of observations is 291.
a See the expression in Appendix to this chapter for the exact definitions.
Variables Definition Unit Mean
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survival under risk. Third, because households with more education and a
larger land area enjoy a higher status in the village, their desire to protect their
community status may induce them to behave in a more risk-averse way
(Tversky and Kahneman 1991). Fourth, the land variable may capture returns
to scale effects. These issues deserve more investigation.
Predicted values of ψ are positive for all observations and distributed be-
tween 1.12 and 3.34 (Table 6-3),5 implying that sample households behave in
a risk-averse way when they allocate land to crops, which is consistent with
risk-averse attitudes and incomplete insurance markets. The estimates for ψ
in this paper are comparable to previous estimates of the relative risk aversion
coefficient in agriculture. Estimates from previous studies range from zero to
over eight with most estimates between one and four (Binswanger 1981;
Newbery and Stiglitz 1981; Saha, Shumway, and Talpaz 1994).
TABLE  6-2
ESTIMATION RESULTS OF THE HOUSEHOLD MODEL (MODEL A)
 1. Parameters characterizing households’ willingness to bear risk
ψ0 intercept of ψ, the relative risk-aversion coefficient 1.585 (0.140)
ψE effect of the years of education of household head on ψ 0.063 (0.016)
ψL effect of the size of owned land on ψ 0.028 (0.008)
ψA effect of the size of owned livestock animals on ψ −0.042 (0.014)
 2. Ordinal consumption preference parameters
βw0 intercept of βw, marginal propensity to consume wheat 0.035 (0.016)
βwd effects of dependency ratio on βw 0.279 (0.047)
βm0 intercept of βm, marginal propensity to consume milk 0.192 (0.009)
βmd effects of dependency ratio on βm 0.213 (0.046)
βr0 intercept of βr, marginal propensity to consume rice 0.014 (0.008)
βrd effects of dependency ratio on βr 0.061 (0.020)
γw per capita subsistence consumption quantity of wheat 4.134 (0.119)
γm per capita subsistence consumption quantity of milk 5.783 (0.149)
γr per capita subsistence consumption quantity of rice 0.906 (0.028)
γo per capita subsistence consumption quantity of other items 7.221 (0.203)
 3. Parameters characterizing technological constraints on crop choices
αk0 intercept in kharif −0.636 (0.010)
αkw effect of tubewell ownership in kharif −0.029 (0.005)
αk1 coefficient on linear term in kharif 0.130 (0.035)
αk2 coefficient on quadratic term in kharif 0.629 (0.031)
αr0 intercept in rabi −0.642 (0.013)
αrw effect of tubewell ownership in rabi −0.017 (0.007)
αr1 coefficient on linear term in rabi 0.289 (0.033)
αr2 coefficient on quadratic term in rabi 0.424 (0.027)
Log-likelihood −3,263.6
Note: 1. Asymptotic standard errors are indicated in parenthesis.
2. The number of observations is 291.
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Results show that households with a higher ratio of children are more vul-
nerable to consumption price risk of food commodities. Most of the ordinal
preference parameters in β and γ are individually significant with correct signs
and reasonable magnitudes (Table 6-2). All three coefficients of the β shifter
(βwd, βmd, and βrd) are positive and statistically significant, which implies that
both the consumption shares of major food items and the marginal propensity
to spend on them are higher for these households. Income elasticities are evalu-
ated at expected income and expected consumption prices for all observations
(Table 6-3). The income elasticity of “other consumption goods” has the highest
sample mean. For most households, this item is a luxury good with income
elasticity greater than unity.
All the coefficient estimates in the technological constraint equations are
individually significant (Table 6-2). Linearity of the constraint is rejected in
favor of a strictly concave curve since both αk2 and αr2 are significantly posi-
tive. Figures 6-2 and 6-3 plot the estimated curves of the technological con-
straints and observed choices by sample households.
Coefficients for the tubewell ownership dummy (αkw and αrw) are negative
and statistically significant in both seasons, implying that farms with tubewell
machinery can allocate land more freely. The absolute value of the tubewell
coefficient is much larger in the kharif season than in the rabi season. The
difference between the two seasons reflects the importance of tubewell own-
ership for the cultivation of kharif crops including basmati paddy. Results in
Chapter 3 imply that active market transactions of groundwater resulted in
equalization of crop yields regardless of tubewell ownership. Nevertheless,
the findings here imply that the control of irrigation risk by owning a tubewell
is an important factor in production decisions in a sense that the ownership
status affects households’ cropping decisions.
TABLE  6-3
STATISTICS OF SIMULATED PARAMETERS
Standard
Deviation
1. Parameter characterizing households’ willingness to bear risk
ψ 1.741 0.322 1.115 3.338
2. Income elasticity of demand
ηw 0.947 0.219 0.411 1.571
ηm 0.847 0.073 0.638 0.977
ηr 0.616 0.149 0.275 0.910
ηo 1.115 0.085 0.922 1.484
Mean Minimum Maximum
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2. Testing for the Effect of Ordinal Preferences on Crop Choices
Do ordinal consumption preferences really affect crop choices under un-
certainty when markets for all consumption goods exist? To answer this ques-
tion, a non-nested test of the model specification is implemented. Two recent
studies that emphasized the importance of ordinal preference effects on pro-
duction decisions were mostly theoretical and did not test their models
econometrically (Fafchamps 1992a; Finkelshtain and Chalfant 1991).6 There-
fore, the specification test is interesting both methodologically and empiri-
cally, because it sheds light on whether a bias is introduced when the effects
of ordinal preferences are ignored.
The hypothesis that ordinal consumption preferences affect crop choices is
supported by the following model specification test. Let Model A represent
the model with ordinal preference effects, and Model B represent the model
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without these effects. Model B is based on the assumption that households
maximize expected utility defined on household income alone when they
choose crop portfolio. Since the two models are strictly non-nested,7 a non-
nested specification test by Vuong (1989) was applied. Denoting the differ-
ence of log-likelihood by LR and the contribution of observation n to the log-
likelihood by lnA and lnB, the test statistic V is defined as
V
N
LR
w
= ⋅ ⋅
1 1
ˆ
,  (6.12)
where
ˆ .w
N
l l
N
l lnA nB
n
N
n
A
n
B
n
N
2 2
1 1
21 1
= −( )[ ]− −( ) = =∑ ∑
Under the null hypothesis that the two models equally fit the data, V is distrib-
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uted as a standard normal variable. If Model A is better than Model B, V?∞;
and if Model B is better, V? −∞.
Table 6-4 gives the FIML estimation results of Model B and the results of
Vuong’s test. The test statistic V in the last row is 4.62, a value sufficiently
large to reject Model B in favor of Model A.
Comparison of the two sets of parameter estimates (Tables 6-2 and 6-4)
indicates that the risk preference parameters are larger for Model B than for
Model A—the estimate for ψ is 1.74 in Model A and 1.83 in Model B at the
sample mean, which implies that households’ willingness to bear risk may be
underestimated if ordinal preference effects are ignored. Though the differ-
ence is not large relative to the estimated standard errors, it was found ro-
bustly that the estimate for ψ was larger for Model B than for Model A.8
Therefore, the clear rejection of Model B in the specification test suggests that
the role of the risk-aversion factor may be exaggerated if ordinal preference
effects on production decisions are ignored. As shown in Chapter 4, the prices
of major food items are not very volatile in the study area. If a similar test had
been implemented in an empirical situation with more volatile market prices
of foods, the difference in the estimates for risk preference parameters might
have been larger.
Furthermore, the two models predict different responses to a change in ex-
ogenous parameters. For example, there should be no supply response when
only ordinal preferences are changed in Model B, such as a change in house-
hold demographic composition. The effects of demographic variables on farm
production have been analyzed in the agricultural household models in which
production decisions are non-separable from consumption preferences due to
incomplete labor markets (Pitt and Rosenzweig 1986; Benjamin 1992). This
study shows that similar non-separable effects of demographic factors might
exist due to incomplete insurance markets.
3. Testing for the Implication of Complete Insurance Markets
The estimates for ψ can be interpreted as a measure of ex post consumption
smoothing possibilities. At the extreme, if risk-averse households are able to
smooth consumption perfectly after the random income is realized, they are
likely to decide on production plans as if they were expected-profit maximiz-
ers.
Vuong’s test was applied to test this implication of complete insurance
markets (Table 6-4). Model A is the same model with ordinal preference ef-
fects under incomplete insurance markets. The alternative model with com-
plete insurance markets (Model B) is characterized by the crop portfolio equa-
tions for expected-profit maximization. The log-likelihood of the estimation
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results of Model B is significantly lower than that of Model A with Vuong’s
test statistic greater than four. Therefore, the implication of complete insur-
ance markets is rejected. The econometric test confirms the claim that sample
households behave in a risk-averse way since they are risk-averse and insur-
ance markets are incomplete, which is consistent with the findings reported
by Morduch (1990, 1991), Udry (1994), and Townsend (1994).
TABLE  6-4
ESTIMATION RESULTS OF ALTERNATIVE MODELS (MODEL B)
Model without Model of
Ordinal Preference Effects Expected Profit
on Crop Choices Maximization
1. Parameters characterizing households’ willingness to bear risk
ψ0 1.691 (0.382)
ψE 0.068 (0.242)
ψL 0.029 (0.040)
ψA −0.049 (0.017)
2. Ordinal consumption preference parameters
βw0 0.035 (0.017) 0.032 (0.071)
βwd 0.278 (0.090) 0.282 (0.149)
βm0 0.192 (0.011) 0.184 (0.013)
βmd 0.211 (0.067) 0.227 (0.286)
βr0 0.014 (0.012) 0.166 (0.015)
βrd 0.061 (0.057) 0.052 (0.030)
γw 4.126 (0.500) 4.114 (0.295)
γm 5.770 (0.437) 5.750 (0.216)
γr 0.904 (0.028) 0.888 (0.087)
γo 7.202 (0.604) 7.174 (0.577)
3. Parameters characterizing technological constraints on crop choices
αk0 −0.636 (0.290) −0.586 (0.080)
αkw −0.029 (0.039) −0.023 (0.019)
αk1 0.122 (1.193) −0.181 (0.525)
αk2 0.642 (1.004) 0.959 (0.544)
αr0 −0.642 (0.171) −0.183 (0.082)
αrw −0.016 (0.030) −0.014 (0.022)
αr1 0.280 (0.202) −1.245 (0.210)
αr2 0.436 (0.039) 1.636 (0.109)
Log-likelihood −3,269.91 −3,483.61
Vuong’s test statistics:
wˆ 0.0801 3.1167
V 4.620 4.138
Note: 1. Asymptotic standard errors are indicated in parenthesis.
2. Vuong’s test is applied against Model A, the model with ordinal preference
effects (Table 6-2).
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IV. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, a household model of production decisions under uncertainty
and incomplete insurance markets has been proposed. The model has a unique
characteristic in that ordinal consumption preferences affect crop portfolio
choices even when markets for all consumption goods exist. Households’ will-
ingness to bear risk, which reflects their risk attitudes and the extent to which
consumption smoothing mechanisms are available, is another factor that af-
fects crop choices. These structural parameters have been estimated by a full-
information maximum likelihood method using the household data.
The parameter estimates for ordinal preferences and households’ willing-
ness to bear risk have been found in a reasonable range. These parameters
vary systematically depending on household characteristics. An interesting
finding is that holding wealth in the form of livestock increases households’
ability to smooth consumption so that they become more willing to bear risk
in production.
A non-nested model specification test has demonstrated that production
decisions by sample households were significantly affected by their ordinal
consumption preferences for goods they produce. Parameter estimates have
shown that sample households behaved in a risk-averse way when allocating
land, a finding consistent with incomplete insurance markets. This finding has
been further supported by a similar specification test, in which a model of
expected profit maximization under complete insurance markets was rejected.
The major result of the findings in this chapter is that households’ ability to
smooth consumption ex post and households’ ordinal consumption prefer-
ences for goods should be considered in analyzing the production behavior of
subsistence farmers in Pakistan. When markets for some consumption goods
are completely missing, farm households have to produce these goods by them-
selves, so that ordinal preferences inevitably affect crop choices. Similarly,
when ex post insurance mechanisms are not available at all, households have
to decide on their production plan according to their risk attitudes. As markets
evolve, however, households no longer have to produce these goods or insure
themselves through production choices—they now have an option to use mar-
kets. Nevertheless, when the markets for goods are thin and insurance mar-
kets are incomplete, they still find it advantageous to grow consumption goods
on their farms as a hedge against price risk and to choose less risky crop
portfolio. This chapter has shown empirically that the presence of risk forges
this kind of link between production and consumption. Furthermore, the re-
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sults suggest that ignoring ordinal preference effects might lead to an under-
estimation of households’ willingness to bear risk.
Appendix to Chapter 6
Details of the FIML Estimation
The system comprises seven equations with an error term vh (h =1,..,7):
(i) First-Order Conditions for the Optimal Crop Choice [(h, s) = (1, k), (2,
r)]
F l f f MRT f f MRT l vh s s s s ti s ti s ti h
it k r
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for s =k, r (season subscript for FOC equations), d = 1, 2 (crop subscript in
function f), t =k, r (season subscript inside the summation), i = 1, 2 (crop sub-
script inside the summation), j =w, m, r, o (subscript for consumption items),
where W and Q are constructed variables and Γ is a constructed parameter,
defined as
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(ii) Technological Constraints on Crop Choices [(h, s) = (3, k), (4, r)]
F l l D l l vh s s sw tw s s s s h; .α α α α α( ) = + + ⋅ + + =2 0 1 1 1 12 (6.A2)
(iii) Consumption Demand System [(h, s)= (5, w), (6, m), (7, r)]
F x p x p Y p vh EP s s EP s s s EP EP j j
j w m r o
h; , ., , ,
, , ,
β γ γ β γ( ) = − + + −

 == ∑ (6.A3)
If the error vector v is independently and identically distributed across ob-
servations and has a jointly normal distribution, a log-likelihood function for
the FIML is written as
ln , , , , ,L l xα β γ ψ Σ( )
= − ( ) − +∑MN N Jn
n2
2
2
ln ln lnπ Σ
− ( ) ⊗( ) ( )−12 1F x l I F x lN, ; , , , , ; , , , ,α β γ ψ α β γ ψ′ Σ (6.A4)
where N is the number of observations; M is the number of simultaneous
equations, which equals seven; Σ is an M-dimensional covariance matrix of
the disturbance vector v; Jn is a Jacobian matrix of the transformation for
observation n; and F (x, l; α, β, γ, ψ) is a (MN×1) vector that stacks up the
seven equations for N observations (Judge et al. 1985, p. 601).
A complicated term in (6.A4) is the Jacobian matrix. Since the subsystem
of (6.A1) and (6.A2) does not have an explicit solution for the endogenous
variables l, it has to be estimated in implicit form. The Jacobian matrix ex-
presses this implicit transformation. It is block-diagonal between the subsystem
of production decisions (the first four equations) and that of consumption de-
mand (the last three equations).
Notes
1 This chapter is based on Kurosaki (1996b).
2 See Morduch (1990) for a case where no explicit insurance is available but saving
is allowed in the interval of [0, xt].
3 See Kurosaki (1995b, chap 3) for more exact definitions and characteristics of
these effects.
4 The magnitude of γ is assumed to be proportional to the household size, so that
the model in (6.7) is estimated based on variables defined in per capita terms in
order to control the effect of household size. The fourth equation for “other con-
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sumption goods” is omitted in the estimation, since the sum of expenditures on
each commodity is the total expenditure by construction.
5 Since ψ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion with respect to the real income
indicated in the bracket in (6.8), the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion was also evaluated for each sample. Its estimates for 285 observations are
distributed between 1.54 and 18.94 with a mean of 3.51 (six observations in which
the expected value of Y−Σpkγk was negative were omitted).
6 Park and Ren (1994) estimated a model that incorporates the effects of ordinal
consumption preference on crop choices. Using a reduced-form approach and
aggregate data on Chinese agriculture, they found that production response to
consumption price risk is different from that to profit risk, which is consistent
with the implications of a model with the effects of ordinal preferences on crop
choices.
7 Both models are composed of the crop-portfolio equations, the technological con-
straint equations, and the consumption equations. The alternative assumption of
Model B results in the crop-portfolio equations without β and γ. Since the sum of
βj’s in the consumption equations is unity because of the adding-up property of a
consumption demand system, the vector β cannot be a zero vector. Therefore, the
two models are strictly non-nested.
8 These results were obtained under a different error structure and using subsets of
sample observations (Kurosaki 1995b, chap. 5).
